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Federalization a la Carte
By ELIZABETH TEAGUE(1)
Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
The rulers of the Russian Federation have embarked on an extensive overhaul of the 
country's administrative organization. Recognizing that the political system inherited 
from the Soviet period was that of a rigidly centralized unitary state, they are trying to 
build a federation, brick by brick, from the bottom up. The process is haphazard, even 
chaotic, with the probable outcome being an "asymmetrical federation" in which different 
regions will enjoy different rights and privileges. But the main aim--the preservation of 
Russia's territorial integrity--seems already to have been achieved.
After the collapse of communist rule and the disintegration of Stalinist-type federations 
in the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, there was great alarm among Russia's 
leaders that the Russian Federation would be the next to fall apart. The country did 
indeed seem, in 1991-92, quite likely to disintegrate. Several of its largest and richest 
regions were threatening to secede unless the center allowed them control over the 
natural resources on their territory and freedom to run their own affairs. At first, 
Moscow's efforts to hold the country together seemed only to make the situation more 
unstable. But the central leadership bought time with a Federal Treaty in March 1992; it 
managed, in December 1993, to introduce a new constitution; and it has now embarked 
on drafting a series of ad hoc, bilateral treaties between itself and the provinces.
To hold the country together, Moscow has had to make substantial concessions to the 
provinces and to fudge a number of important issues concerning the respective spheres 
of competence of the federal center and the periphery. Optimists describe this as an 
exercise in "constructive ambiguity" that will permit the gradual evolution of a true 
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federation. Pessimists warn that the failure to clarify basic relationships at this stage 
may, in the longer term, make an equitable distribution of power between the center and 
the provinces harder to attain.
In a unitary state, sovereignty originates in the center and remains its exclusive 
prerogative throughout the territory. In a federation, power is shared between the center 
and the regional subdivisions. However, there is no ideal type of federation, and there 
are several ways in which the process of sharing power may be achieved. Under one 
model, sovereignty is deemed to originate in the center, which delegates some of its 
powers to the individual regions. All powers that are not specifically described in the 
constitution as belonging to the regions remain the prerogative of the center. 
Alternatively, sovereignty may be deemed to originate in the regions, which transfer 
some of their powers upward to the federal center but retain certain attributes of 
sovereignty at the regional level. All powers not specifically granted by the constitution 
to the center remain with the individual regions.
The federation now taking shape in Russia fits yet another model--where the issue of 
who is delegating sovereignty to whom is blurred. Powers are shared between the 
center and the provinces, without any discussion of where sovereignty originates. Thus, 
the 1994 treaty between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tatarstan speaks 
simply of the "mutual delegation of powers" between the parties.
Conflict over the division of powers destroyed the Soviet Union. One after another, the 
union republics declared themselves sovereign and announced that their laws took 
precedence over Soviet laws. Encouraged by their example, Russia's 21 ethnically 
based republics also claimed the right to run their own affairs. (Russia's republics 
supposedly act as "national homelands" for Russia's largest ethnic groups--Tatars, 
Chuvash, Bashkirs, and so on. They enjoy more autonomy than the 55 territorially 
based krais and oblasts. However, the titular nationality forms an absolute majority in 
only 5 of Russia's republics, whereas ethnic Russians are an absolute majority in 10.) 
Russia's republics declared themselves to be sovereign states and, like the union 
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republics, laid claim to all the land, industrial assets, and mineral resources on their 
territory. Some claimed the right to secede. Most of them did this not because they 
really wanted to break away, but because they hoped to reap the benefit of exploiting 
their rich natural resources. Determined to get more power for Russia, President Boris 
Yel'tsin encouraged their desire for autonomy in order to weaken President Mikhail 
Gorbachev and the Soviet center.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russia's republics demanded the autonomy 
Yel'tsin had promised them. The question of power-sharing became a football between 
Yel'tsin and the Russian parliament. Finding it impossible in such circumstances to 
adopt a new constitution, Yel'tsin settled instead for a Federal Treaty. Signed in March 
1992 by all Russia's territories except Tatarstan and Chechnya, this was an exercise in 
"constructive ambiguity" that left many issues of competence obscure. By creating a 
breathing-space and allowing tempers to cool, it prevented Russia from falling apart. 
Moreover, it distracted the leaders of the krais and oblasts from the idea of secession by 
focussing their attention on catching up with the republics, which were seen as having 
received more privileges in the Federal Treaty.
It was not until December 1993, after he had dissolved parliament by force, that Yel'tsin 
was able to get a new constitution adopted. By establishing a strong presidency, this 
restored a measure of stability. Because the new constitution did not resolve the issue 
of the division of powers between the center and the periphery, however, pressure for 
autonomy continued. Whenever they felt could they get away with it, the republics and 
regions have grabbed more powers. The center has responded by negotiating a series 
of bilateral treaties between the Russian Federation and its autonomy-minded parts.
The first, between Russia and Tatarstan, was signed in February 1994. Russia 
recognized Tatarstan's right to have its own constitution and laws, form its own budget, 
levy republic taxes, and conduct its own foreign policy. Tatarstan won the right to 
exempt its young men from military service (instead, they must complete a program of 
alternative civilian service) and to confer its own citizenship (even though this is 
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arguably little more than a residence permit). Russia has since signed similar treaties 
with the Republics of Kabardino-Balkaria and Bashkortostan. Next in line are the 
Republics of Udmurtia and North Ossetia, Krasnodar Krai, and Orenburg and 
Kaliningrad oblasts.
Though the idea of the whole signing an agreement with part of itself is unorthodox, it 
has proved rather effective. Three years ago, Moscow was afraid Tatarstan would 
secede. Today, Tatarstan is a model member of the Russian Federation and its treaty is 
held up as an example to others. Hopes have been expressed that the formula might 
resolve Russia's dispute with Chechnya, which in 1991 declared itself entirely 
independent. The idea has also been seized on by separatists in Ukraine's Crimea and 
Georgia's Abkhazia--although it has been rejected by both the countries concerned, 
since neither wishes to become a federal state.
Russia's treaty with Tatarstan has loopholes. It cites as its authority two mutually 
inconsistent documents--the constitutions of Tatarstan and Russia. While the former 
describes Tatarstan as "a sovereign state, a subject of international law," the latter does 
not recognize the sovereignty of Tatarstan or of any other Russian province. Squabbles 
over interpretation seem certain to arise at some future date. In the long run, moreover, 
a system of bilateral agreements threatens to undermine the Russian constitution and to 
turn Russia into a treaty-based, rather than a constitution-based, state. That means that 
a republic that signed a treaty with the center might claim the right to secede if it felt the 
center had not kept its side of the bargain.
Russia's treaties with the republics have angered the krais and oblasts, which complain 
that they do not enjoy equal rights. The arbitrariness of Russia's taxation system 
remains a particular source of conflict between center and periphery. In August 1994, 
resource-rich Perm Oblast announced that it would transfer no more federal taxes to 
Moscow. Perm's leaders were protesting Russia's treaty with Bashkortostan. Perm pays 
more in taxes to the center than it gets back, while for Bashkortostan the opposite 
applies.
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Meanwhile, other krais and oblasts have been adopting charters giving themselves 
extra powers. Since the charters are being drafted by provincial governors they are--not 
surprisingly--concentrating increased powers in the hands of local executives. 
Democratically elected legislatures are often the first casualty. Civil rights are another, 
and allegations are mounting that leaders in far-flung places are building personal 
fiefdoms that have little in common with pluralism or democracy. In Maritime Krai and 
Bryansk Oblast, for example, local newspapers have been shut down by order of 
regional leaders. The threat to press freedom is especially worrying since national 
newspapers are increasingly hard to obtain in the provinces. This means that the press 
cannot perform the watchdog role assigned to it in democratic societies.
Sergei Filatov, Yel'tsin's chief of staff, told an interviewer that it was difficult for the 
center to force the provinces to bring their constitutions and charters into conformity with 
federal laws.(2) The charter drafted by Tambov Oblast, for example, asserts that laws 
adopted by the regional legislature take precedence over federal laws. So too do the 
constitutions of the Republics of Bashkortostan, Buryatia, Chechnya, Ingushetia, 
Kalmykia, Karelia, Komi, Sakha, Tatarstan, and Tuva. Bashkortostan and Sakha have 
claimed the right unilaterally to decide how much they will contribute to the federal 
budget, while Tuva wants its own defense policy and customs service. There are wide 
differences in the approach of the various provinces to privatization, especially of land. 
The constitutions of Bashkortostan, Buryatia, Sakha, Tatarstan, and Tuva all define the 
powers of the federal center as the sum of the powers delegated upward by the 
provinces whereas, according to Filatov, the powers of the Russian Federation spring 
"from its own sovereignty as a single, integral, federative state."
In response to complaints such as Filatov's, Yel'tsin's adviser Leonid Smirnyagin has 
argued that Russia's overriding need is for a radical devolution of power.(3) "One can 
only rejoice," Smirnyagin asserted, "that people in the regions are coming to understand 
that the main source of local solutions is to be found in the region itself, not in Moscow." 
Russia, he declared, has embarked on "the high road to genuine federalism." 
Tatarstan's relations with Moscow demonstrate that, in the short term, ambiguity can be 
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a useful tool, enabling lawmakers to sidestep issues that are too contentious to tackle 
directly. In the intervening lull, the sides can concentrate on building new relationships 
based on mutual interests. History suggests, however, that respect for the rule of law is 
an essential ingredient in any democracy--perhaps even the most important ingredient. 
At some point, therefore, Moscow and the provinces will be forced to come to grips with 
the ambiguities characterizing their relations. Disparities between the civil rights of the 
inhabitants of different regions will certainly need to be eliminated. A system of taxation 
that is seen to be fair must be introduced. But, for the time being, Russia's efforts to 
build a federation from below have brought a measure of stability (except in Chechnya) 
to center-periphery relations that, only a couple of years ago, few observers expected to 
see.
1 Elizabeth Teague is an Adviser to the CSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities. The views expressed here are her own and do not necessarily reflect those 
of the High Commissioner or the CSCE.
2 "Questions to the Head of the Presidential Administration," Rossiiskie vesti, 31 August 
1994, p. 1.
3 L. Smirnyagin, "The Heart of the Matter. The Separation of Powers No Longer Exists 
at the Local Level," Segodnya, 2 August 1994, p. 3.
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